Deck

Copart · CPRT · NASDAQ

Copart runs the dominant US online auction marketplace for salvage and total-loss vehicles, taking fees on each of the millions of cars that insurance carriers route through its 250 yards across 11 countries every year.

$32.38
Price
$31.3B
Market cap
$4.6B
Revenue (TTM)
36.5%
Operating margin
Listed at split-adjusted $0.14 in March 1994; peaked at ~$64 in May 2025 (~450× from IPO); now $32.38 — about half the peak, sitting on a 52-week low.
2 · The tension

A 16-year growth streak just broke at the same moment the multiple cut in half — the next two prints decide which one was right.

  • The cadence. Revenue went from +10–14% quarterly through early FY25 to −3.6% in Q2 FY26 — the first decline since the pandemic — then a soft +2.1% in Q3. Nine-month FY26 revenue: −0.2%. US service revenue was −5.6% in Q2 and improved to −0.4% in Q3, but management has not explained the weakness in any 10-Q.
  • The multiple. P/E compressed from a 10-year average of 30.5× to 20.2×; EV/EBITDA from 21.3× to 13.9×. The Street has quietly shifted the comp from historical CPRT toward LKQ at 12.9× — pricing the slowdown as terminal rather than cyclical.
  • The variable that decides it. Two consecutive quarters of US service revenue. Above flat is consistent with cyclical (FY25 hurricane base lapse + FX + used-car normalization); below −2% is consistent with structural (IAA share rebalancing, demand reset). The Q4 FY26 print lands early September 2026.
Q2 broke a 16-year streak. Q3's +2.1% rebound said it might not be a break at all. Two prints settle it.
3 · The moat in numbers

A salvage duopoly where one side runs 36.5% operating margins and the other runs 15.5% — a decade after RB Global paid $7.3B to close the gap.

36.5%
Operating margin vs 15.5% at RB Global
30.1%
ROIC 7 straight years above 28%
$4.8B
Cash on balance sheet zero debt for 4 years
1M
Registered buyers across 185 countries

The moat is the asphalt and the title queue, not the auction software — ~250 permitted yards holding $3.7B of land near US population centers, direct computer links into state DMVs for salvage-title issuance, and a million-buyer network that pulled 38.8% of US units off to international IP addresses in FY25. RB Global paid $7.3B for IAA in 2023 explicitly to scale against Copart; three years on, the 21-point margin gap hasn't narrowed by a single point. The next RBA segment disclosure is the leading test of whether that holds.

4 · The buyback the Street isn't modeling

$1.6B retired in nine months — Copart's first material buyback in 40 years — yet consensus FY27 EPS still implies share count falling 2%, not 6%.

  • First in 40 years. $1.633B repurchased across 9M FY26 — share count down 3.6% YoY by Q3, with $4.2B of net cash still on hand after the spend. From FY2018 through FY2025, Copart's net buyback was essentially zero; the cash sat in T-bills while the multiple peaked at 37×.
  • The denominator. At the 9-month pace (~$2.1B annualized) against 977M shares, count compounds down 6–7% a year. Even at flat operating income, EPS grows ~6% from retirement alone; ~$300M of T-bill interest income on remaining cash adds another point. Street FY27 EPS of $1.70 (3.4% off FY25) clearly under-models this — the implied math at $1.85 and 22× lands at ~$41, equal to the Street target without any operational reacceleration.
  • The catch. No multi-year framework disclosed, no target capital structure, no commentary linking the pivot to the slowing topline. Directors sold $50M+ over 18 months with zero open-market buying, and in September 2025 the board waived its anti-pledging policy to let founder Willis Johnson collateralize up to 20% of his ~56M-share stake. Bears read it as reactive, not regime change.
Sustained $400M+/quarter into FY27 would make the pivot durable. A drop below $300M would say it was opportunistic. The 10-K MD&A in late September is where the framework either appears or doesn't.
5 · The overhang in Note 15

A DOJ anti-money-laundering investigation has sat in identical 10-K language for two years — and it touches the exact lever the bull case depends on.

  • What's disclosed. The DOJ Consumer Protection Branch is investigating Copart's AML controls on auction-platform member onboarding. The language is identical across the FY24 and FY25 10-Ks — no charging document, no scope, no timing, no accrual. A third year of identical disclosure would be a non-event; any material change — consent decree, market exclusions, onboarding restrictions — would touch the international buyer pool that consumed 38.8% of US units in FY25 and drove +18.9% International service-revenue growth.
  • Why it lands here. The buyer-onboarding pipeline is the engine of revenue-per-car expansion — the single largest lever in the long-term thesis after total-loss frequency. A KYC-only resolution leaves the moat intact; a consent decree restricting onboarding constrains the variable the variant view rests on. There is no public timeline and no consensus expectation.
  • The governance fingerprint. Founder + son-in-law own 8.9% with no diversification mechanism — owner-aligned by any standard — but the September 2025 pledging waiver is uncomfortable behavior at a multi-year low, and the lead independent director is a former Copart officer of 21 years' standing. The board's April 2026 equity grant to CEO Liaw, his first in four years, is the next real test of independence from the founder family.
FY26 10-K Note 15 lands late September. It is the only event in the next six months that could move the long-term thesis without earnings.
6 · Bull & Bear

Lean long with proof required — the durable variables justify the multi-year underwrite, but conviction sizing waits on two US service-revenue prints.

  • For. Cheapest the moat has ever been. 20.2× P/E and 13.9× EV/EBITDA versus 10-year averages of 30.5× and 21.3× — a ~35% compression with the 36.5% operating margin, 30.1% ROIC, and $4.2B net cash intact. The 21-point margin gap to RBA has held a decade including the post-IAA period.
  • For. The capital pivot has arrived. $1.6B retired in 9 months pulls EPS forward 6–7% even at flat operating income; an 18/100 Clean forensic grade and 21 straight years of cash flow above net income remove the accounting-trust discount that normally penalizes peer-average multiples.
  • Against. Management's silence on US softness. Three consecutive quarters of declining-to-flat US service revenue with no narrative in any 10-Q is exactly the silence an honest cyclical story wouldn't require — and RB Global's salvage segment has compounded at 27% over five years versus Copart's 16%.
  • Against. A live DOJ AML matter parked in the footnotes. Identical Note 15 language for two consecutive 10-Ks; a consent decree restricting buyer onboarding would touch the international pool that drove 38.8% of FY25 US units. The September 2025 founder pledging waiver is the uncomfortable tell that bears get to point at.
My view — the moat math and the buyback denominator carry more weight than the silence, but I'd wait. The Q4 FY26 print in early September is the decision point: US service revenue positive YoY and Q4 buyback above $400M would flip this from watchlist to build; another negative print would pull the right comp toward LKQ at 13× and frame the bear range toward $24.

Watchlist to re-rate: US service revenue YoY in Q4 FY26 (early Sept 2026) and Q1 FY27 (mid-Nov) — must turn positive on the easier hurricane comp; buyback cadence vs the $530M/quarter FY26 pace and the presence of a multi-year framework in the 10-K MD&A; FY26 10-K Note 15 language on the DOJ AML investigation.